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Absolute Publishing Power and Bulletproof Immunity:
How Section 230 Shields Internet Service Providers from
Liability and Makes It Impossible to Protect Your
Reputation Online
Victoria Anderson*
“Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, Is the
immediate jewel of their souls: Who steals my purse
steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing; ‘Twas mine, ‘tis
his, and has been slave to thousands: But he that filches
from me my good name Robs me of that which not
enriches him, And makes me poor indeed.”1
INTRODUCTION
Although written hundreds of years ago, this quote from Othello still
rings true in the twenty-first century because human nature has largely
remained the same. Human beings still place great importance on the
perceived reputation of others when choosing who to associate with. A bad
reputation can mean lost business opportunities and friendships.
Additionally, humans still have the tendency to act out of spite and tarnish
the reputation of others, sometimes through spreading false information.
The recognition of these truths as to the nature of humanity is why
libel laws have existed for so long. The tort of defamation has long preexisted the creation of the United States (we borrowed the concept from
English common law) because of the inevitability of its occurrence and the
level of harm it can do to a person,2 despite its tension with First
Amendment values. Each generation has had varying levels of success
* Victoria Anderson is a third-year law student at Seattle University School of Law and serves as an
editor on the Law Review. Victoria thanks her husband, Ben, for his continued love and support.
Victoria also thanks her daughters, Nora and Bella, for inspiring and motivating her to pursue a legal
education.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3, l. 160–66.
2. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L.
REV. 546, 566 (1903).
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reconciling this tension. Unfortunately, in the twenty-first century we have
allowed modern systems of communication to distract us from the
importance of this necessary balance.
Today, as more of our communications move online, the potential
damage that defamation can have on an individual’s reputation can be
severe.3 Internet defamation is widespread, difficult to fully correct or
retract, and oftentimes made with complete anonymity.4 The Internet’s
reach is unlike any form of communication in history. However, a victim
of online defamation has far fewer options for legal recourse than a person
who is defamed in the physical world, even though the damage has the
potential to be far greater.
The lack of legal recourse afforded to victims of online defamation
is due to the way Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(Section 230) is written and construed. Section 230 immunizes Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) from liability for limiting or restricting access to
objectionable material and prevents ISPs from being treated as original
publishers of information they did not create but appears on their
platforms.5 The scope of immunity reflected in judicial decisions since its
enactment basically amounts to blanket immunity—any liability for thirdparty content is prohibited.6 For example, if a person is defamed on
Facebook, only the original content creator is liable for defamation. Even
if Facebook knew the content was defamatory and did not remove it, as an
ISP it is completely immune from liability for the content’s defamatory
character.7
Despite this prevailing interpretation, there is another way to
interpret Section 230 that is more consistent with traditional defamation
law. The alternative interpretation leaves open the possibility of imposing
distributor liability on ISPs and users who transmit defamatory content. In
other words, the language of Section 230 suggests the potential for ISPs to
be categorized as distributors, holding them liable if they know or have
reason to know of defamatory content on their platform. Therefore, in the
above hypothetical regarding Facebook, liability could be imposed if a

3. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, A Vast Web of Vengeance, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/technology/change-my-google-results.html/
[https://perma.cc/Z4AM-NM9M].
4. See id.
5. Jeff Kosseff, The Lawsuit Against America Online That Set Up Today’s Internet Battles,
SLATE (July 14, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/07/section-230-america-online-kenzeran.html [https://perma.cc/CEB4-U2YY]; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also VALERIE C. BRANNON
& ERIC N. HOLMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46751, SECTION 230: AN OVERVIEW 8 (2021).
6. See Kosseff, supra note 5; see also BRANNON & HOLMES, supra note 5, at 11.
7. See Kosseff, supra note 5; see also BRANNON & HOLMES, supra note 5, at 14–15.
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plaintiff can prove that Facebook had knowledge of the defamatory
content and then failed to take reasonable action.
This Note contends that under current interpretations of Section 230,
there is little to no accountability for online defamation, thus Congress
should consider amending Section 230 and removing contradictory
language, so victims of defamation can hold ISPs accountable for
defamatory content that they do not reasonably investigate and remove.
Victims of online defamation should be permitted a legal path forward as
opposed to the blind alley created by the current interpretation of Section
230. Part I of this Note discusses the history and importance of defamation
laws. Part II explores how courts have applied Section 230 in online
defamation cases and how current interpretations of the statute create a
barrier for victims of defamation. Finally, Part III recommends novel
Section 230 interpretations and amendments that provide victims of
serious Internet defamation legal recourse.
I.

HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF DEFAMATION LAWS

A.

The Conflict Between Free Speech and Defamation

The importance of an individual’s reputation formed the basic notion
of the tort of defamation. An individual’s reputation “[i]n the
communitarian view . . . is the image of the individual created and held by
others.”8 Therefore, “defamation was seen as an attack . . . on the very
essence of the self.”9 Defamation laws in America had to be balanced with
an individual’s right to free speech.10 As indicated in the U.S. Bill of
Rights: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press.”11 In the United States, freedom of speech was
(and is) considered to be paramount to protect citizens from a strong
central government.12
However, despite the apparent tension between defamation laws and
freedom of speech, libel was maintained as common law tort.13 In essence,
defamation was designed to effectuate society’s “pervasive and strong

8. M. M. Slaughter, The Development of Common Law Defamation Privileges: From
Communitarian Society to Market Society, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 352 (1992).
9. Id. at 353.
10. David L. Hudson Jr., Libel and Slander, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 14, 2020),
https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/997/libel-and-slander [https://perma.cc/9DLE-4BGG].
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See Andrew T. Kenyon, What Conversation? Free Speech and Defamation Law, 73 MOD.
L. REV, 697, 701 (2010).
13. Hudson, supra note 10.
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interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”14 The
continued existence and enforcement of defamation laws indicates that
protecting reputation is still considered relevant in sustaining a lawful
society, which accords respect to every individual. In fact, defamation law
shares a common principle with freedom of speech: the inherent value of
the individual. Freedom of speech under the First Amendment reflects the
importance of one’s ability to voice his opinion to “further a search for
truth, further the operation of democracy or self government, and further
the development of autonomous subjects or individual liberty.”15
Defamation laws reflect the value of one’s right to protect his reputation
among his peers and recognize the damage that false, published statements
can do to an individual.16
B.

A Brief Explanation of Defamation Laws

To be considered defamatory, a statement must cause others to view
the subject of the statement unfavorably. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, “[a] communication is defamatory if it tends . . . to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him.”17 This does not mean the majority of the community must react to
the individual unfavorably, but only that the defamatory statement has a
negative impact on his reputation among a substantial number of people
in the community.18 Traditionally, a prima facie defamation claim
included the following three elements: (1) a false and defamatory
statement concerning another; (2) published to a third party without
privilege; and (3) the publication harms the plaintiff.19
The level of responsibility one has for sharing defamatory content
depends on how the law classifies the sharer—as a publisher or
distributor.20 These legal distinctions are based on the presumed level of
control each classification has over the published materials.21 For instance,
primary publishers—such as a newspaper or magazine publisher—face
strict liability for defamatory content because they have more editorial

14. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
15. Kenyon, supra note 12, at 701.
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 559, 577 (AM. L. INST. 1977); see also
Michelle J. Kane, Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483, 485 (1999).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §559 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1977).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §558 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
20. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).
21. Amanda Groover Hyland, The Taming of the Internet: A New Approach to Third-Party
Internet Defamation, 31 HASTINGS COMMC’NS. & ENT. L.J. 79, 96 (2008).
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control.22 They “can be held liable for defamatory statements contained in
their works even absent proof that they had specific knowledge of the
statement’s inclusion.”23 “Primary publishers that republish false
statements are usually held to the same standard of liability as the original
author of the statement.”24 Conversely, a distributor—such as a bookstore,
newspaper stand, or a Facebook user who shares a post—may face liability
for content they did not create when they transmit it.25 Distributors are
presumed to be passive conduits of information and include entities that
have little or no control over what they republish.26 If classified as a
distributor, one will only be held liable if they knew or had reason to know
that the third-party material transmitted was defamatory.27 This standard
provides shelter for entities that cannot screen the content they distribute
because of the knowledge requirement.
C.
Online Defamation Before Section 230
The aforementioned classifications of ISPs yielded contradictory
results prior to the enactment of Section 230. The two cases prompting
Section 230’s enactment, Cubby v. CompuServe28 and Stratton Oakmont
v. Prodigy,29 yielded entirely different results.
In Cubby, CompuServe, an online library, was not held liable for
defamatory statements because it did not know the statements at issue had
been published on their forum.30 Subscribers to CompuServe had access
to forums.31 The “Journalism Forum” focused on the journalism industry
and was managed by Cameron Communications, Inc. (CCI).32 CCI
contracted with CompuServe to “‘manage, review, create, delete, edit and
otherwise control the contents’ of the Journalism Forum ‘in accordance
with editorial and technical standards . . . as established by
CompuServe.’”33 The plaintiffs alleged that the defamatory statements at
issue were published as part of the Journalism Forum carried by
22. Id. at 97.
23. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, DAN
B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
113, at 810 (5th ed. 1984)).
24. Hyland, supra note 21, at 96–97.
25. See Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for
Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 471 (2004).
26. Hyland, supra note 21, at 97.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
28. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
29. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
30. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139–41.
31. Id. at 137.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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CompuServe; therefore, CompuServe should be classified as a publisher
of the statements.34 CompuServe moved for summary judgement and
asserted “that it acted as a distributor, and not a publisher, of the
statements, and cannot be held liable for the statements because it did not
know and had no reason to know of the statements.”35 Because
CompuServe did not manage the content itself, the court characterized
CompuServe as a distributor; therefore, any liability would have to be
based on knowledge it had of the defamatory posting.36 Since the plaintiff
could not show that CompuServe had the requisite knowledge to impose
distributor liability, the court granted CompuServe’s motion for summary
judgment and held that it was not liable for the defamatory posting.37
In Stratton Oakmont, the trial court reached the opposite conclusion.
In that case, Prodigy, a computer network with subscribers communicating
over bulletin boards, was sued for defamatory statements posted on a
board titled “Money Talk.”38 The plaintiffs claimed that Prodigy was a
publisher and could be held to a stricter standard of liability39 for the
defamatory statements because it “exercised editorial control over the
content of messages posted on its computer bulletin boards,” and actually
“held itself out” as asserting editorial control.40 The court ultimately
agreed with the plaintiffs without departing from the holding in Cubby.
The court distinguished Stratton Oakmont from Cubby in two ways:
“[f]irst, P[rodigy] held itself out to the public . . . as controlling the content
of its computer bulletin boards. Second, P[rodigy] implemented this
control through its automatic software screening program . . . .”41 The
court saw the use of the software as “actively utilizing technology and
manpower to delete notes . . . on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad
taste,’ . . . [as Prodigy was] clearly making decisions as to content, and
such decisions constitute editorial control.”42 These actions placed Prodigy
in a unique position as a publisher; thus, the court held that Prodigy was
liable for the defamatory postings.43

34. Id. at 138.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 140–41.
37. Id. at 141.
38. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
39. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ( “Publishers can be held
liable for defamatory statements contained in their works even absent proof that they had specific
knowledge of the statement’s inclusion.”).
40. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 4–5.
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THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 230

The decisions in Cubby and Stratton Oakmont became known by two
U.S. representatives, Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR), who
introduced Section 230 as part of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA).44 Their concern was that Stratton Oakmont “seemed to punish a
well-intentioned effort to provide a ‘family-oriented’ computer service.”45
By enacting Section 230, Congress hoped “to overturn the result in
[Stratton Oakmont by removing] any disincentives for ISPs to police their
service for offensive content.”46 This was accomplished in two parts of the
statute. First, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) reads: “No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider.”47 The
plain reading of this statutory language indicates that “§ 230 creates a
federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”48
Essentially, courts cannot allow claims that regard computer service
providers as publishers.49 Any of these services that make editorial
decisions about what to keep up or remove from their platform will be
immune from liability.50 Thus, Section 230(c)(1) overturns the result in
Stratton Oakmont by allowing ISPs to keep defamatory content up without
fault.
Second, Congress used Section 230(c)(2) to protect ISPs that monitor
and screen content. That section reads:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith
to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,

44. Ashley Johnson & Daniel Castro, Overview of Section 230: What It Is, Why It Was Created,
and What It Has Achieved, ITIF (Feb. 22, 2021), https://itif.org/publications/2021/02/22/overviewsection-230-what-it-why-it-was-created-and-what-it-has-achieved [https://perma.cc/7KUS-22CZ];
see also Lee, supra note 25, at 473.
45. Lee, supra note 25, at 473.
46. Id.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). An “information content provider” is defined in Section 230(f)(3) as
“any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. §
230(f)(3). In contrast, an “internet service provider” (ISP) is the medium on which the content is
distributed, not the creator of the content itself. ISPs are eligible for immunity according to the plain
reading of Section 230. See BRANNON & HOLMES, supra note 5, at 11–12.
48. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
49. Id.
50. Id.

8

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:1

harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected ….51

Section 230(c)(2) essentially gives ISPs the power to regulate content
in good faith without worrying about First Amendment lawsuits. With the
continuing threat of impending lawsuits, Congress was concerned that new
Internet companies would not achieve the same level of growth.52
The purposes of Section 230 are listed in the statute itself.53 Most
importantly, Section 230 includes the following: preserving the free
market as it currently exists;54 promoting the “continued development of
the Internet and other interactive . . . media”55; and encouraging “the
development of technologies which maximize user control.”56
A.
Online Defamation After Section 230: Zeran v. AOL
An early judicial decision chose to read Section 230 broadly. Zeran
v. America Online, Inc. reflects the later trends of judicial decisions,
despite being wrought with controversy. Essentially, Zeran created “a kind
of immunity with no offline parallel.”57
In Zeran, the plaintiff sued America Online (AOL) for unreasonable
delay in “removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third
party.”58 The post at issue advertised t-shirts relating to the recent
Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building.59 The t-shirts
included phrases such as: “Visit Oklahoma . . . It’s a BLAST!!!” and
“Finally, a day care center that keeps the kids quiet—Oklahoma 1995.”60
The post instructed those interested in the shirts to call “Ken” and included
the plaintiff’s phone number.61 This distasteful prank caused the plaintiff
to receive angry and derogatory messages, as well as death threats.62 At
one point, he received an abusive call every two minutes.63 Once the
plaintiff informed AOL about what was going on, the post was removed.64
However, a similar post resurfaced shortly after, and the calls began

51. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
52. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
53. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3).
57. JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS 196 (10th ed. 2020).
58. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
59. Id. at 329.
60. Kosseff, supra note 5.
61. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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flooding in once again.65 AOL frequently assured the plaintiff that they
were handling the issue, but according to the plaintiff there was a
significant delay in any action taken.66 As a defense to this suit, AOL
invoked Section 230 and moved for summary judgment.67
The plaintiff in Zeran argued that Section 230 immunity did not
extend to distributor liability, and an ISP like AOL could be held liable if
they had specific knowledge of the statement’s defamatory nature.68 The
plaintiff pointed out that “distributor” takes on a different legal meaning
than “publisher,” 69 and “publisher” is the only phrase included in Section
230(c)(1).70 Therefore, the plaintiff asserted that Section 230 does not
protect distributors, and AOL could be considered a distributor “like
traditional news vendors or book sellers,” thereby warranting liability
because AOL had the requisite knowledge of the defamatory post and
failed to act.71
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to grant
AOL’s motion for summary judgment for three main reasons.72 First, the
court reasoned that AOL fell “squarely within [the] traditional definition
of a publisher.”73 Quoting W. Page Keeton, the court stated that “[e]very
one who takes part in the publication . . . is charged with publication.”74
Therefore, the court reasoned that even if AOL could be classified as a
distributor, it was still a type of publisher because it had the choice of
whether to “publish, edit, or withdraw the posting.”75 From the court’s
perspective, the plaintiff was trying to impose liability upon AOL for
exactly what Section 230 protects it from: imposition of liability on an
Internet service provider for statements made by another information
content provider.76
Second, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s interpretation was
inconsistent with the original policies behind the law. According to the
court, imposing notice liability “reinforces service providers’ incentives to
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 331.
69. Id.
70. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”).
71. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
72. Id. at 328.
73. Id. at 332.
74. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, DAN
B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
113, at 799 (5th ed. 1984)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 333.

10

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:1

restrict speech,”77 which has a “chilling effect on the freedom of Internet
speech.”78 Additionally, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s
interpretation “would deter service providers from regulating” offensive
content for fear of facing distributor liability.79
Finally, the court reasoned that this interpretation would create a
flood of lawsuits resulting in an impossible burden for ISPs.80 The court
stated that the plaintiff’s interpretation would defeat the law’s policy of
encouraging the development of the Internet and new technologies
because ISPs could not continue to grow in the face of endless lawsuits.81
After Zeran, courts dealing with Section 230 defamation claims have
largely agreed with Zeran’s holding. In fact, this broad interpretation of
Section 230 was stretched to its farthest possible lengths in Blumenthal v.
Drudge.82 In that case, the court granted summary judgment to AOL even
though AOL contracted and paid for the allegedly defamatory gossip
column that was at issue in the case.83 Unlike Zeran, where the posts were
written by anonymous users, the posts in Drudge were written by
identifiable Internet users. Yet, the court still refused to impose liability
even though the ISP in that case promoted the problematic content and
paid the original content-creator.84
In practical effect, Zeran created a three-part inquiry:
(1) is the defendant an ‘interactive computer service’ within the
meaning of Section 230; (2) does the plaintiff’s cause of action treat
the defendant as a publisher; and (3) was the content at issue in the
suit ‘provided by another information content provider?’ If a
plaintiff’s cause of action against a website or other computer service
treats that service as a publisher of third-party-created-content, the
defendant will be immune from liability—end of story.85

B.
Lingering Questions in a Post-Zeran World
After the court decided Zeran, the plaintiff, Kenneth Zeran, began
advocating for a change in the law. He believes that the right approach is
to treat “all platforms as distributors . . . providing them with protections
until they are notified of the allegedly illegal user content.”86 According to
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
83. Id. at 53.
84. Kane, supra note 16, at 483.
85. Gregory M. Dickinson, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity Under Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 868 (2010).
86. Kosseff, supra note 5.
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Zeran, “he never would suggest that platforms have an obligation to
proactively detect illegal content; rather, they should be able to handle
complaints and remove harmful content after being notified.”87
Specifically, Zeran contends that “[t]he operative word isn’t monitoring or
filtering . . . [i]t’s response.”88
Zeran is justified in questioning the outcome of his case because it
led to troubling policy questions and conflicts. Perhaps the most obvious
is that the Zeran interpretation of Section 230 immunity is a license for
bad actors to spread defamatory information. The Zeran decision demands
no personal responsibility for those who act with intention, particularly
because the statute provides user immunity.89 Users are situated differently
than ISPs in substantial ways that do not align with the holding in Zeran.
Individual users are not faced with the task of monitoring a large volume
of third-party content; rather, they are only tasked with regulating
themselves. Additionally, users may be more likely than ISPs to actively
engage in malicious propagation of defamatory or offensive material and
bear personal responsibility for the content they distribute.
An additional concern with continuing to adhere to the holding in
Zeran is the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet, which has grown out
of “its infancy . . . into a vigorous and muscular adolescent.”90 The
Internet is a different medium than it was when Congress enacted Section
230 and when the court decided Zeran twenty-four years ago. The policies
which were adhered to in the 1990s are arguably out of touch with the state
of the Internet today. For example, the drafters of Section 230 worried
about ISPs being able to monitor massive amounts of content.91 However,
today ISPs have the ability to do this, mostly through notification systems
that are employed by users.92 These systems allow users to flag content
that goes against the platform’s established guidelines.93 ISPs hire
individuals, who serve as “fact checkers,” to monitor content as well as
remove potentially misleading or false information.94 These new realities
demonstrate that responding to user concerns over defamatory material is
no longer an impossibility for ISPs. While the Internet has “continue[d] to
serve as a valuable facilitator of free expression . . . it has now become
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher . . . .”).
90. Lee, supra note 25, at 491.
91. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
92. See, e.g., How Our Fact-Checking Program Works, FACEBOOK JOURNALISM PROJECT (Aug.
11, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/how-itworks [https://perma.cc/YLU9-PQGV] [hereinafter FACEBOOK JOURNALISM PROJECT].
93. Id.
94. Id.
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such a robust and integral part of modern life that it can safely be subjected
to at least minimal regulation.”95
Moreover, Section 230 is premised on the notion that Internet speech
deserves special protections because the Internet is a special forum for the
exchange of robust and diverse ideas.96 However, the courts and Congress
have not sincerely questioned the truth of this proposition. Why is Internet
speech special? Why do ISPs deserve more rigid protections than
publishers in the non-virtual world when Internet defamation can cause
even more damage to the victim?97 This is perhaps another example of
how notions about the Internet in the 1990s no longer reflect the state of
the Internet today.
Surprisingly, despite the policy decision to protect ISPs from
liability, ISPs are given explicit permission to remove content as they see
fit. This permission is granted in Section 230(c)(2) and allows ISPs to act
as a publisher and remove content for any reason as long as they perceive
it to be “objectionable.”98 This provision of Section 230 seems to render
(c)(1) superfluous. “If providers who choose to censor third-party-created
content are already immune under subsection (c)(1) because the content is
not their own, then what can be the purpose of subsection (c)(2), which
grants immunity if they choose to censor?”99 This provision poses more
questions than it solves problems for three reasons. First, the statute
imposes a “good faith” standard on the provider or user, as well as a
subjective standard of what they consider to be “obscene, lewd . . . or
otherwise objectionable.”100 This part of the law maximizes ISP control of
their platforms to take down what they please, completely at their
discretion, which could undeniably have the effect of “chilling” Internet
speech. This seems completely contrary to at least two of the statute’s
stated goals: maximizing user control and maintaining robust Internet
speech.101 Second, ISP liability is not consistent with how they are treated.
Section 230(c)(2) explicitly gives ISPs publisher-like editorial control,
while (c)(1) bars their treatment as publishers. Third, as part of the CDA,
these sections read together are contrary to the stated goals of the Act.102
The original goal was to shield minors from harmful material on the
Internet.103 Congress sought to achieve this by criminalizing “the
95. Dickinson, supra note 85, at 874.
96. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
97. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 3.
98. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
99. Dickinson, supra note 85, at 869.
100. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
101. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)–(3).
102. Dickinson, supra note 85, at 870.
103. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
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‘knowing’ transmission of ‘obscene or indecent’ messages.”104 In contrast,
Section 230 immunizes ISPs when they leave up offensive material.105
Those who advocate for maintaining Section 230 as it is written
would say that (c)(2) solves part of the Stratton Oakmont dilemma.106 In
that case, the court held Prodigy liable for the defamatory content on its
bulletin board because it placed itself into the role of a publisher by
actively screening messages.107 The decision in Stratton Oakmont
provided a disincentive to others like Prodigy to filter any content for fear
of litigation. Section 230(c)(2) hopes to prevent this same result by
allowing self-regulation. Congress wanted to encourage ISPs to selfregulate at their own liberty without worrying about First Amendment
claims.108 However, (c)(2) does nothing to protect defamed individuals.
Why would an ISP self-regulate if there were no consequences (under
(c)(1)) should it decide not to? Market forces could arguably motivate an
ISP to remove objectively obscene content that the average user would not
want to see (such as grotesque images or language) but might not motivate
them to remove content that defames one individual. Without the threat of
a lawsuit, an ISP has nothing to lose by keeping the material online; why
would it waste its time with removal?
III.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There is a myriad of problems with the current status of Section 230
which cannot be remedied with a one-size-fits-all solution. Before any
type of reform takes place, the legislature must reexamine what general
policy goals should be prioritized going forward, given what we know
about the Internet today. Is the main goal to maximize user control and
protect Internet speech at all costs, defamation victims be damned? If so,
(c)(2) must be reconsidered because of the power it gives ISPs to control
speech. Conversely, Congress could attempt to balance the interests of free
speech and defamation, as lawmakers and courts have attempted to do
throughout history. That is a much more sensible policy solution,
especially given what we know about how much damage the Internet can
do to one’s reputation.
There are many solutions that can be implemented to better align
Section 230 with traditional defamation laws, Section 230’s original
policy goals, and the Internet policies lawmakers should be pursuing. This
104. Id. at 859.
105. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
106. See supra Part I.C.
107. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
108. Lee, supra note 25, at 474.
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Note offers four possible changes to Section 230 to achieve these goals:
first, interpreting Section 230 narrowly; second, revising Section 230(c)(2)
so that holistically, the entire law is more consistent with the original
policy goals of promoting robust Internet speech and maximizing user
control; third, revising Section 230 to impose user liability; and finally,
imposing ISP liability using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as a
model.
A.
A Narrower Construction
The interests of defamation victims can be balanced with original
Section 230 policies by changing the way the law is currently interpreted
to include distributor liability. The original policies include preserving the
free market as it currently exists;109 promoting the “continued
development of the Internet and other interactive . . . media”110; and
encouraging “the development of new technologies which ‘maximize user
control.’”111 This can be accomplished without any changes to the
language of the statute. Currently, broad immunity is granted to ISPs,
whereas a different reading could attach significance to the fact that the
word “distributor” is not included in the language of Section 230.112 Under
a narrower construction, if courts find distributors are not included under
Section 230, distributors would be liable based on the knowledge they had
about the defamatory posting at the time. This interpretation is completely
plausible because of its consistency with common law, which recognizes
a legal distinction between publishers and distributors.113 In fact, Congress
could have been aware of this distinction when it drafted Section 230.
There is no need to assume, as the court in Zeran did, that the underlying
desire to protect the First Amendment was also supposed to totally
sacrifice the competing value of defamation laws,114 especially because an
alternate interpretation is entirely plausible: distributors should not be
included within this broad immunity because they do not fall under the
umbrella term of a “publisher.”115
If this interpretation prevails, the result in Zeran would have been
more satisfactory. In that case, despite the plaintiff continuously notifying
AOL of the online harassment he was experiencing, AOL was able to
escape liability for allowing online defamation because of Section 230
109. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
110. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
111. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3).
112. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
114. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir.1997).
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977).

2021]

Absolute Publishing Power & Bulletproof Immunity

15

protections.116 Under a narrower construction, if the court characterized
AOL as a distributor, it would be liable based on the knowledge it had
about the defamatory posting at the time. AOL employees acquired this
knowledge when the plaintiff notified them about the problematic posts.117
The plaintiff would have well deserved recourse in a situation in which it
was clear he was being defamed anonymously with AOL being the only
avenue for restraining the problem.
Additionally, the result in Cubby would remain undisturbed. In that
case, CompuServe contracted with a separate entity to monitor its platform
and thereby did not know or have reason to know of any of the defamatory
postings at issue.118 Under this proposed interpretation, because
CompuServe would not have the requisite knowledge required to be
classified as a liable distributor, it would not have been liable.119
The main objection to a narrower construction of Section 230
immunity is that the result in Stratton Oakmont would be the same, but
Congress enacted Section 230 to overturn that decision. However, this is
not necessarily true. In Stratton Oakmont, the court held that because
Prodigy represented itself as controlling the content on its message boards,
it was liable as a publisher of the defamatory information.120 If the case
was decided in a post-Section 230 world while applying a narrower
interpretation, it is possible that Prodigy would have been granted Section
230 immunity because it would still be classified as a publisher, not a
distributor. Prodigy was determined by the presiding court to be a
publisher because it publicly represented itself as controlling the content
on its message boards, thereby accepting the highest degree of editorial
control and the highest standard of liability.121 Thus, Congress’ initial
concerns about Stratton Oakmont are not reasons against a narrow
construction because even under a narrower construction of Section 230
allowing for distributor liability, Prodigy would not be liable because of
their classification as a publisher, which is explicitly immunized in the
language of Section 230.122
However, it would be a mistake not to mention the potential
problems with a narrower construction, especially as it relates to Stratton
Oakmont. It may not be fair to compare that case with Zeran, which is an
116. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
117. Id. at 329.
118. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (requiring that it must know or have reason to
know).
120. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
121. Id. at *4–5.
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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ethically clearer case. In Zeran, the defamatory posting served little First
Amendment value—it was a prank which contained demonstrably false
information resulting in extreme harassment.123 However, in Stratton
Oakmont, the opposite is true. The postings in that case accused others of
criminal behavior and lying, 124 which (if truthful) does have value in
becoming public knowledge. Furthermore, a narrower construction in a
case that is more similar to Stratton Oakmont could lead to puzzling
results: why should a publisher who retains more editorial control over
content be subjected to immunity, whereas distributors with less control
can face liability if they have the requisite knowledge? Such an
interpretation could also prompt every ISP to either clearly establish
themselves as publishers and be granted immunity or shield themselves
from any knowledge about what is posted to avoid distributor liability,
thereby inhibiting any incentives it may have had to engage in selfpolicing.
These are valid concerns that would render a narrower construction
essentially useless. However, ISPs already have no incentive to self-police
when it comes to a defamed individual, as seen in Zeran.125 Under Section
230(c)(1), nothing will happen to an ISP if it does not act because it will
not be treated as the “publisher or speaker” of the defamatory
information.126 Additionally, if an ISP classified as a distributor
intentionally shields itself from having knowledge, it may still be liable if
there were reason to know of a post’s defamatory nature.127 The “reason
to know” standard could prevent ISPs from intentionally ignoring posts
because in certain situations, an ISP may still have reason to know about
defamatory content (such as in Zeran where the plaintiff had notified AOL
of the problem), which would subject it to liability despite not having
actual knowledge.128 This standard and market forces—which will
encourage ISPs to invoke some level of content moderation in order to
attract and obtain user traffic—will prevent ISPs classified as distributors
from intentionally ignoring postings to avoid liability. The market will not
allow an ISP to plead ignorance if the goal of an ISP is to run a profitable
Internet service, and in turn ISPs cannot claim ignorance when they have
reason to know.
Additionally, Congress can justify imposing notice liability on
distributors while granting publishers immunity. If the goal is to encourage
123. See generally Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.1997).
124. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
125. The content posted was not of an objectively obscene nature; rather, the harm was
concentrated on one individual which provided no incentive for AOL to remove the post.
126. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
128. Id.
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self-policing and minimal government interference, that encouragement
could be realized by not faulting ISPs who participate in this type of
monitoring for some instances that get overlooked, assuming it has made
a good faith effort. A distributor, on the other hand, has much less
responsibility and can better monitor content since it is only required to
act if something is specifically brought to its attention. Judicial discretion
could be applied in these situations: the more responsibility an ISP takes
on in self-policing, the more generous a judge should be in excusing
mistakes made in good faith. If the ISP takes a more hands-off approach,
it will be expected to investigate and act reasonably when notified because
it has not already taken matters into its own hands.
A.

Reconsidering and Revising Section 230(c)(2)

Another suggested solution is a revision to Section 230(c)(2). This
section is puzzling when compared to (c)(1) because it contradicts what is
arguably the most important policy behind Section 230: maintaining
robust Internet speech.129 While (c)(1) does not treat an ISP as a publisher
or speaker of third-party content, (c)(2) allows them to act as publishers
by allowing them to remove content they find to be “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable.”130 The issue with the wording of (c)(2) is the catchall
phrase, “otherwise objectionable.”131 This essentially gives ISPs
publisher-like power over third-party content, while (c)(1) prevents them
from facing legal culpability for their content, thereby giving ISPs the
ability to control the free flow of information. The amount of control ISPs
have under (c)(2) could have other downstream impacts on speech in a
free society. For example, ISPs could have a strong influence “on shaping
independent thought, market access, consumer behavior, election
integrity and speech . . . . In a very real way, these platforms are
transforming the nature of what it means to be ‘free’ in a free society.”132
The more companies that engage in moderating behaviors, the more
we move away from the original policy behind the law: ensuring true
diversity in Internet discourse.133 Giving ISPs this privilege in conjunction
with Section 230(c)(1) allows them to be gatekeepers without legal
accountability. As such, policymakers should remove the contradicting
129. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
131. Id.
132. Rachel Bovard, Section 230 Protects Big Tech from Lawsuits. But It Was Never Supposed
to
Be
Bulletproof,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
13,
2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/12/13/section-230-big-tech-free-speech-donaldtrump-column/3883191001/ [https://perma.cc/LPJ3-67HP].
133. Id.
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language in Section 230(c)(2) to promote Internet speech. By removing
the term “otherwise objectionable” from 230(c)(2) and making the
existing list exhaustive, lawmakers can limit the reasons an ISP may
lawfully remove content. Then, an ISP can be held accountable when
removal was not sufficiently based on one of the listed reasons.
There are two additional reasons for amending Section 230(c)(2) that
do not relate to defamation. First, the juxtaposition between Sections
230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) highlights the contradictory nature of Section 230
in its explicit language and purported policy. This contradiction further
shows that Congress did not intend Section 230 to fully upend common
law. Second, there should be regulations on platforms that control such a
large percentage of information because of the risk of drowning out other
voices. The First Amendment becomes obsolete if that right is subject to
the discretion of the Big Tech oligarchy. By removing the catchall phrase
“otherwise objectionable” and maintaining an exhaustive list of content
categories appropriate for removal, ISP control would be limited and user
control would be maximized, resulting in protection of the right to free
speech and a limit to ISP discretion. Furthermore, defamatory content
should be included in that exhaustive list.
B.
Imposing Distributor Liability on Users
A third suggestion is to remove user immunity from Section 230. The
explicit language of Section 230 grants user immunity along with ISP
immunity.134 The term is not defined but it has been given its common
meaning; individuals who choose to participate in online forums.135 The
presumed reason for its inclusion is contained in the statute itself:
maximization of user control.136 Users should feel free to disseminate
information from third parties, thereby empowering Internet speech.137
While user immunity is enumerated in the statute, it is yet another
policy contradiction when considering the justifications for Section 230
immunity. Particularly, individual users are not comparable to ISPs under
the analysis in Zeran. For example, the Zeran court was concerned that
ISPs could not monitor and respond to massive volumes of third-party
postings.138 However, users are not similarly situated because they are only
responsible for regulating their own online behavior. Additionally, ISPs
typically bear less responsibility for third-party content than users because
134. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher . . . .”).
135. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006).
136. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3).
137. Barrett, 146 P.3d at 516.
138. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir.1997).
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ISPs are more likely to distribute information passively through its users,
whereas individual users are more likely than ISPs to act with malicious
intent when distributing defamatory information.
The above differences seem to indicate that users should face some
type of legal responsibility for knowingly disseminating defamatory
information on the Internet, just as they would in the non-virtual world.
Section 230 as it is currently written has the potential to serve as a license
for bad actors to knowingly and intentionally engage in this damaging
behavior. If a user had the requisite knowledge that the content they
distributed was defamatory, distributor liability is appropriate and should
be imposed.
Imposing distributor liability on users would not have a “chilling”
effect on Internet speech because, like distributor liability in the nonvirtual world, the burden of proof for imposing distributor liability in a
defamation case is very high. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
establishes that a distributor “is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows
or has reason to know of its defamatory character.”139 This standard deters
litigants from bringing defamation suits because the burden of proof is
substantial.140 Also, the fact-finding process in a defamation lawsuit is
extensive and costly.141 Individual Internet users who become defendants
in defamation cases are unlikely to have the funds to cover a judgment in
the plaintiffs favor (especially after paying for litigation). These two
factors prevent truly frivolous defamation suits from actually making it to
trial and do not have a profound effect on speech. The same is true for a
lawsuit based on Internet defamation. There will not be a lawsuit every
time defamation occurs online for precisely the same reasons why there is
not a lawsuit every time defamation occurs in print.
User liability may also solve part of the dilemma faced by ISPs. If
distributor liability deters a user from disseminating defamatory
information, presumably there will be less defamatory content for ISPs to
respond to. As noted earlier, users are much more likely to engage in active
and malicious distribution of defamatory material, whereas ISPs tend to
take a more passive role. If users are deterred with legal consequences,
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
140. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 875 (2000).
141. David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem and Possible
Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1297 (1995) (“[I]f you add up all the litigation costs and the
money that is actually paid to plaintiffs—if you add up all the money that both the plaintiff and the
defendant have thus spent as a result of the litigation—somewhere between 3.5% and 8% of that goes
to the plaintiff, and over 90% . . . go to legal fees and expenses.”).
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there will theoretically be less defamatory content circulated in the first
place.
A legal deterrent is necessary for online users because it is vital that
the law encourages individuals to take responsibility for their actions. As
technology develops, and as more communications occur online,
regulations that hold individuals responsible for online behavior become
more necessary. Whether perpetrators are acting online or not is irrelevant
to whether they are responsible for their actions. Therefore, imposing
notice-based distributor liability on users of Internet services could
reinforce this personal responsibility and prevent some online defamation
from occurring in the first place.
C.

Imposing Distributor Liability on ISPs Using the DMCA

Although imposition of user liability makes sense from a policy
standpoint, it may not yield satisfactory results for the victim. If a plaintiff
can overcome the high standard of proof and cover the costs of defamation
litigation, a defendant who is an individual user is unlikely to have the
funds to make a lawsuit worthwhile. Therefore, victims of online
defamation should have some avenue of legal recourse against ISPs when
they can meet the high standard of proof and classify the ISP as a
distributor.
In Barrett v. Rosenthal, the California Court of Appeals pointed out
an interesting contrast between Section 230 immunity and another form of
immunity granted under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA):
The DMCA immunizes providers who transmit material that
infringes the rights of the holder of a copyright if the provider did not
originate the infringing content, has no editorial control over the
material, does not know the material is infringing or have reason to
know, acts expeditiously to remove the material after learning of the
infringement, and receives no financial benefit from the infringing
activity.142

The Barrett court pointed out that liability allowed under the DMCA
is similar to distributor liability under common law because a distributor
is classified as someone with little editorial control over the defamatory
material; knowledge of the defamatory nature of the material is a
prerequisite to liability. 143 Additionally, the court stated that DMCA

142. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 158 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App.), as modified (Feb. 3,
2004), review granted and opinion superseded, 87 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2004), and rev’d, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal.
2006) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d)).
143. Id.
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liability might demonstrate that “Congress d[id] not feel this level of
liability [would] unduly chill Internet communication.”144
The DMCA is a helpful model that can be used to implement noticebased liability on ISPs who qualify as distributors thereby making Section
230 more consistent with common law. “The DMCA conditions ISP
liability for online infringement of copyright-protected works on the
service provider’s actual or constructive knowledge of infringement.”145
Similarly, Section 230 could be revised so that ISPs would only face
liability when they failed to remove defamatory content based on
sufficient notice. Therefore, the plaintiff’s burden would be to demonstrate
that an ISP had the necessary knowledge about the defamatory content and
still failed to take it down.
A possible revision to Section 230 based on the DMCA could include
a specific process on how to give the requisite notice to ISPs. Then, when
an ISP receives notice, the ISP must act reasonably to remove the
defamatory content, and if not, face liability. To balance First Amendment
concerns, a process allowing the accused to defend their use of the
allegedly defamatory content should be included in the revision. A
common critique of the DMCA is that it “treats the fair user and the
infringing user exactly the same way; it denies both users the opportunity
to defend their respective uses before takedown.”146 The same critique
could apply to a revised Section 230: someone who distributes content that
is not defamatory would face the same legal consequences as a person
spreading truly defamatory information. For this reason, and because of
the particularly delicate balance between defamation and the First
Amendment, there should be accessible options for the person defamed to
request removal and for the person accused of defamation to contest
removal.
Notification systems do not place a substantial burden on ISPs
because many already have notification systems in place that allow users
to report certain objectionable material.147 The problem with defamation
online is the lack of incentive ISPs have to remove it. A notification
provision added to Section 230 would provide that incentive and allow for
victims of defamation, who can meet the high standard of proof that
distributor liability requires, to recover against ISPs that do not act
reasonably after receiving notice of defamatory material on their service.
144. Id.
145. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: Revisiting § 230 Immunity, 30
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1554 (2015).
146. Charles K. Lane, The DMCA’s Safe Harbor Provision: Is It Really Keeping the Pirates at
Bay?, 14 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 205 (2013).
147. See, e.g., FACEBOOK JOURNALISM PROJECT, supra note 92.
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To avoid arbitrary removals, as Section 230 in its current form
attempts to prevent, “reasonable action” must have a clear definition that
is articulated in the statute itself. The term “reasonable action” still gives
ISPs discretion to act in many forms depending on the circumstances. For
example, if a post is not taken down immediately, an ISP can attach a
notice to the post which reads “this post is subject to investigation because
it possibly contains defamatory content.”148 Then, reasonable action would
constitute conducting a good-faith investigation and making a
determination about removal. The ISP will not face liability if it conducted
a good faith investigation on which they based their decision, whether or
not it removes the post. On the other hand, if the potentially defamatory
post is removed immediately, the poster should have an avenue for
contesting removal clearly outlined in Section 230 (as previously
suggested).149
Another possible revision to Section 230 is to require ISPs who fail
to establish clear guidelines for notification and removal to follow the
notice take down procedures outlined in a revised Section 230. This would
allow (and encourage) ISPs to set up their own reasonable procedures for
dealing with a complaint of defamation. An ISP will therefore become
open to liability if they fail to establish procedures and do not abide by the
procedures outlined in the statute, or if the plaintiff can demonstrate that
an ISP’s established procedures are not reasonable, not followed, or
applied improperly. This way, a victim of online defamation will have
options and be able to bring suit whether or not an ISP decides to create
its own guidelines for handling defamation complaints.
CONCLUSION
The language in Section 230 has made it difficult for a plaintiff to
recover damages for defamatory statements made by third-party users
online. The courts’ broad construction of Section 230 has produced
troubling results that completely reject traditional defamation laws and
allow bad actors to escape responsibility for their behavior online. As more
of our communications move online, it is vital that Congress amends
Section 230. Courts may also address these concerns by adopting a
narrower construction of Section 230 that allows for the imposition of
distributor liability. Additionally, Congress can change the text of Section
230 to include distributor liability. To further clarify Section 230,
Congress should first revise Section 230(c)(2) to dispose of contradictions
148. This is similar to the fact checking feature ISPs have recently been using. A label will
accompany a posting that the ISP suspects contains false information, warning other users of what it
possibly contains.
149. See supra pp. 26–27.
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within Section 230, thereby making the law more holistically consistent in
promoting Internet speech. As a general policy, it is important to make
sure ISPs take responsibility for the platforms they govern and not become
cultural gatekeepers. Second, Congress should remove the word “user”
from Section 230(c)(1), which would allow for the imposition of user
liability. This change would encourage individuals to act responsibly
online and likely eliminate much of the online defamation that occurs.
Finally, Congress should use the DMCA as a framework for notice take
down provisions under Section 230 and allow ISP liability based on notice.
Each of these proposals is more consistent with traditional
defamation laws than Section 230 in its current form. As a society, we
should not allow modern forms of communication to complicate the
simple notion that individuals should have avenues of recourse for
defamation. The tort of defamation, whether it occurs online or in-person,
should allow individuals to protect their reputation, which in turn, protects
their mental health, livelihood, and relationships with others.

